ABSTRACT Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are very vulnerable to spoofing due to the low power level and opening service mode. Although pseudorange-based Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) method performances effectively in spoofing detection and exclusion through a consistency check method, it might still suffer from threats which are deliberately designed. Besides an exhaustive research on the defense method, a deep understanding of the possible attack modes of the spoofing methods is also crucial for positioning security. This paper proposes a new threat for pseudorange-based RAIM, named adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning, which can mislead the victim receiver deducing any targeted position within a certain range without triggering the RAIM alarm. First, the adversarial attack is formulated as an optimization problem that minimizes the difference between the misled GNSS positioning results and the targeted position with RAIM missing detection. Then, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is applied to solve the optimization problem and obtain the adversarial examples for GNSS spoofing. Simulated and real GNSS data experiments are designed to verify the threat range and efficiency of the adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, with the rapid development of satellite navigation systems, e.g. Global Positioning System (GPS), Galileo, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) and other regional systems, multi-constellation Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has been widely used in various civil and military applications. However, GNSS signals are very vulnerable to spoofing due to the low power level and opening service mode [1] , [2] . In practice, a GNSS spoofing intends to mislead a victim receiver deducing a false position by broadcasting false signals that the victim receiver will misinterpret them as authentic signals. As GNSS spoofing is a serious threat to the users especially in safety critical applications, defense methods have always been one of the hottest topics in the community of GNSS [3] , [4] .
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The existing work has carried out a lot of research on GNSS spoofing methods and defense methods. A deep understanding of the possible attack modes of the spoofing methods always plays a very important role in promoting the progress of defense research. The defense methods can be divided into Signal Processing Level (SPL), Data Bit Level (DBL), and Navigation and Position Solution Level (NPSL) according to the processing aspects of the receiver [30] . SPL always distinguishes spoofing signals and authentic GNSS signals with the utility of signal information, such as signal power [5] , spatial processing [6] , time of arrival [7] , signal quality [8] , etc. It is a very import method to protect spoofing signals from accessing to the following measurement calculating or positioning solution. Different with SPL, DBL and NPSL emphasize on measurement information, such as satellite ephemeris and pseudoranges, to detect and exclude spoofing signals that injected with counterfeit measurements [9] - [11] . In the procedure of the defense system, NPSL is always applied following with SPL and DBL. Thus, NPSL is also regarded as the last defense of the security system, which is crucial in guaranteeing the accuracy and reliability of the GNSS positioning results.
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is a very important NPSL which is used in most of the GNSS receivers [12] . It is designed to detect and exclude fault measurements effectively through a consistency check method. RAIM is also essential for safety critical applications, such as aviation application and intelligent transportation systems [13] - [15] . Usually, the performance of RAIM is sensitive to the geometric distribution of observable satellites and the fault modes, and the faults on different observable satellites have different effects on the performance [16] . However, as the fault modes are deliberately designed and very complex in the scenario of spoofing attack, RAIM might face more challenges for defensiveness than system outlier detection [17] . In the scenario of spoofing attack, the number of counterfeit pseudoranges and the fault values might be deliberately designed to defeat RAIM detection method with a consistent feature. Moreover, specific fault design might also mislead the victim receiver deducing any targeted position within a certain range.
Currently, spoofing or usually named as adversarial attack is also a hotspot in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) [18] - [21] . The main idea of adversarial attack is to force a well-trained deep learning model or other machine learning model to produce erroneous outputs by adding tiny perturbations that could not be recognized by human. Adversarial attack has been proved to be very effective in image classification [22] , automatic speech recognition [23] , reinforcement learning [24] , etc. It is very meaningful for analyzing the characteristics of the model and for further robustness improvement [25] .
As the descriptions above, the process of GNSS spoofing threat for RAIM is somewhat similar to the adversarial attack in machine learning problem. In this paper, we make the analogies as: (a) spoofing pseudorange faults versus input perturbations, (b) RAIM versus human recognition, and (c) GNSS positioning model versus machine learning model. It will be very meaningful to investigate and discuss the misled GNSS positioning result when given a set of deliberately designed pseudorange faults that can not be detected by RAIM. The results of our research show that there would be a new threat for pseudorange-based RAIM when using adversarial attack method.
In this paper, inspired by the adversarial attack method in deep learning model, this paper mainly researches on adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning. The purpose of this paper is to use the adversarial method to generate spoofing observations that can defeat the existing RAIM system and mislead the victim receiver deducing any targeted position within a certain range. To achieve this, the adversarial attack is formulated as an optimization problem that minimizes the difference between the GNSS positioning results and the targeted position with RAIM missing detection. To the best of our knowledge, studies on adversarial attack on GNSS positioning are quite rare.
The main contribution of this paper mainly includes two points. On the one hand, the characteristics and shortages of the widely used RAIM methods of the GNSS receiver can be more clearly recognized, which might provide the direction for further improvement. On the other hand, our studies can be easily extended to other spoofing detection methods, such as machine learning based method [26] . Through the investigation of the possible new threat mode like adversarial attack method, the corresponding defense methods might be further studied.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The details of the proposed adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning are presented in section II. Section III shows and discusses the experimental results of the adversarial attack method on GNSS positioning. Finally, the conclusions are shown in Section IV.
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON GNSS POSITIONING
In this section, the method of adversarial attack on GNSS positioning is detailed presented as follows. First, the framework of the adversarial attack on GNSS positioning is illustrated. Then, adversarial attack is formulated as an optimization problem that minimizes the difference between the misled GNSS positioning results and the targeted position with RAIM missing detection. Finally, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [27] is applied to obtain the adversarial examples for GNSS spoofing. The FGSM calculates the gradient with respect to the input of the model to maximize the loss function to bring the worst impact. Specifically, it uses the sign of the gradient to make it easier to satisfy that the added perturbation is very small and cannot be easily recognized. In this paper, the FGSM is applied to solve the proposed optimization problem and obtain the spoofing measurements that cannot be recognized by the RAIM method.
A. FRAMEWORK
While there are varies of threat modes for GNSS positioning in the aspect of measurements, our work focuses on the threat mode for pseudorange-based RAIM in a way of adversarial attack in AI. In this paper, the threat mode of the adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning is to construct a set of pseudorange faults added to the normal observational pseudoranges of a victim receiver, which can defeat the RAIM and mislead the victim receiver deducing the targeted position synchronously.
A brief illustration of the threat mode for adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning is shown in Fig. 1 . First, the spoofing system constructs the pseudorange faults according to the proposed adversarial attack method. Second, the counterfeit observations are injected into the victim receiver. Assuming that the spoofing signals is able to defeat SEM firstly, the receiver calculates the test statistics through pseudorange-based RAIM method using the spoofed observations. Finally, the test statistics is compared with a predefined threshold to identify whether there is any fault among the observations. If the test statistics is larger than the threshold, the adversarial attack is failed and the RAIM warning will be outputted. Otherwise, the adversarial attack is succeeded in spoofing the receiver and the spoofed positioning result will be outputted through the GNSS positioning model.
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper, we formulate the problem of constructing the pseudorange faults as an optimization problem. Given a victim receiver, the normal GNSS observations is consisted of the observation pseudoranges ρ ∈ R N and the GNSS ephemeris data ∈ R N ×4 , where N is the number of the observational GNSS satellites of the victim receiver,
T and ρ n i ∈ R is the normal observational pseudorange of the i th observational satellite,
∈ R 3 and one dimension clock C S i ∈ R of the i th observational satellite. The targeted position intended to be misled is denoted as p R t ∈ R 4 . Then we solve the formulation
where δ ∈ R N is the pseudorange faults created by the adversarial attack method, M ∈ R N is a masking vector used to limit which satellite observation is to be attacked, the compute sign ⊗ is the element-wise production. f PM (•) is the GNSS positioning model, p R s ∈ R 4 is the positioning results with spoofing attack. f RAIM (•) is the function to calculate the test statistics in the RAIM method, which is compared with the threshold T h ∈ R + for fault detection. A more detail about the components in (1) is described as follows.
C. GNSS POSITIONING MODEL
In this paper, the most widely used least squares method is applied for GNSS positioning and the observational pseudorange equation is determined with single constellation [28] . In fact, our method can be easily extended to multi-constellation applications and other GNSS positioning models.
The pseudorange equation is obtained as
where p R r ∈ R 4 is the true position vector of the GNSS receiver, which is composed of the three dimension position
− C S is the clock bias, c = 2.998 × 10 8 is the light speed, ε i is the observation error caused by receiver noise, ionospheric noise, multi-path error, etc.
Eq. (2) above can linearized be using Taylor series [28] , yields
where ρ ∈ R N is the difference pseudoranges,
is the observation matrix. Specifically, all of the elements of the last column of H is the light speed c. The item ε ∈ R N is the error vector of the observational pseudoranges.
The solution of Eq. (3) by means of least squares method can be obtained as
Given an initial position vector x 0 , Eq. (4) is iterated to obtain the positioning solution, i.e.
where the symbol ← is numerical updating during the iteration. In this paper, the iteration procedure can be implemented via the function named while_loop in Tensorflow [29] .
D. TEST STATISTICS IN RAIM
The main process of RAIM method is to calculate the test statistics using pseudorange measurement residual and the amount of redundancy. Then the test statistic is compared with a threshold value T h which is determined based on the required probability of false alarm. In this paper, the traditional residual-based RAIM is applied as an example to calculate the test statistics [11] . With the advantage of adversarial attack method, our approach can be easily extended to other RAIM method. VOLUME 7, 2019 Given the measurement equation in Eq. (3), the residual matrix can be obtained as
where I N ∈ R N ×N is the N by N identity matrix. The residual vector is defined as r = S ρ
Then, the test statistic of the RAIM method is given by
The test statistic T s in Eq. (8) can be a feature of consistency of the observations for a receiver. If there is no pseudorange fault and no observation errors, the test statistic is zero in theory. When there is no pseudorange fault, the test statistic T s would follow a chi-squared distribution with N − 4 degrees of freedom. The receiver system will output the RAIM warning if T s ≥ T h . Or, it will calculate and output the positioning result using GNSS positioning model if T s < T h . Thus, to guarantee the effectiveness of the spoofing, the proposed method would prevent the RAIM alarm from being triggered during the spoofing process, i.e. T s < T h . Thus, the spoofing method should self-check whether there will be a RAIM alarm during the generation process of the adversarial attack. If T s ≥ T h , the method would output a self-check spoofing failure and the method does not work.
E. MASKING VECTOR
To investigate the performance of adversarial attacks for GNSS positioning in different case, the masking vector is proposed to determinate which satellite observations are to be attacked. In practice, the difficulty and cost for spoofing different observational satellite of the victim receiver might be very various. Thus, the spoofing method would more like to attack some of the observational satellites instead of all of them.
The masking vector in Eq. (1) is a one dimension vector, whose elements are composed by 1 and 0, which indicate that the observational satellite is spoofed or not, respectively. The element-wise production is used to limit the attacked satellites, as shown in Eq. (1)
F. CONSTRUCTING PSEUDORANGE FAULTS
To solve the optimization problem in Eq. (1) with given GNSS positioning model f PM (•), RAIM method f RAIM (•) and the masking vector M, the FGSM is applied to construct pseudorange faults.
In [23] , [27] , the FGSM is proved to be very effective for adversarial attacks in the space of images and speech. Conventionally, to train a machine learning model, gradients are computed to minimize a defined loss function calculated by the predictions of the model and the designated label. However, in the idea of adversarial attack, the gradient with respect to the input of the model is computed to maximize the loss function to bring the worst impact. Instead of using the gradient value directly, the FGSM using the sign of the gradient to make it easier to satisfy that the added perturbation is very small and cannot be easily recognized by human.
Based on the idea of adversarial attacks, the FGSM is applied to take a single step in the direction of the gradient of the loss function in Eq. (1). That is, given a model f PM (•), the input ,ρ = ρ + M ⊗ δ, the designated position p R t and the loss function , the adversarial attacks can be gradually approached as
where η ∈ R + is a small constant to be tuned. Eq. (9) shows one step that adding a perturbation to the existed measurements. Then the pseudorange is iteratively updated to calculate the adversarial attacks for GNSS spoofing. The measurement perturbation ηM ⊗sign(∇ρ (f PM ( ,ρ), p R t )) is mainly consisted of three parts. First, the positive coefficient η is used to control the step value of each pseudorange update. Second, the masking vector M is used to limit the attacked satellites. The third part is the gradient with respect to the pseudorange sign(∇ρ (f PM ( ,ρ), p R t )), where the sign of the gradient is applied to make it easier to satisfy that the added perturbation is very small and cannot be easily recognized by RAIM.
In Eq. (9), the coefficient η affects the update of pseudorange and consequently the alarm of RAIM, which determine whether the spoofing attacks succeed or not. For example, if the value of η is very small, the convergence time will be very long. Oppositely, if the value of η is very larger, the original consistency feature may be quickly broken in the iterative process and trigger the RAIM alarm. In this paper, we set η = 0.1 as an example to mainly illustrate the existence of adversarial attacks for the GNSS receiver and should be paid more attention in future defense method research. A more detail relationship between η and the spoofing effect will be further investigated in our future work.
The proposed method for adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning is summarized in the following Algorithm 1. The aim of the proposed adversarial attack method is to mislead the receiver obtaining a targeted position. Although the expectation value of the spoofed positioning result and the targeted position are almost the same, the adversarial attacks might not exactly mislead the receiver to the targeted position due to the GNSS observation errors. Thus, during the iteration of our algorithm, a small distance threshold D ∈ R + is defined. As long as the distance between the positioning result and the targeted position is smaller than the certain range D, the receiver is considered to be succeeded spoofed. In this paper, D = 3m, and the initial value D 0 = 100m is set for the iteration. During the process of the adversarial attack, the test statistics is computed in each step of the loop to make sure that the method is able to cause missing detection for the existing RAIM.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Attacks on GNSS Positioning

Input:
, ρ, p R t , M ephemeris data ρ observation pseudoranges
Generate adversarial example using Eq. (9) ρ =ρ + ηM ⊗ δ 5. calculate test statistics for RAIM
if T s ≥ T h do end while and output self-check spoofing failure 7. compute the spoofed result using positioning model p R s = f PM ( ,ρ) 8. update loss function using Eq. (1)
9. end while
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, simulated and real GNSS data are applied and two separated experiments are designed to evaluate the performance of the adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning. The first experiment is to illustrate the property of the adversarial attacks on different GNSS geometric distribution using simulated data. The second experiment is to test the practical performance of the proposed method using real GNSS observation data, which is obtained by a GNSS receiver on a running car.
A. REAL DATA AND SIMULATED DATA All of our experiments were conducted using PyCharm software in PC with a Core i7 CPU (2.93-Ghz with 8-GB memory). The real data and simulated data are described as follows.
1) REAL DATA
In this paper, the real test data was collected with a GNSS receiver (NovAtel DL-V3) in Beijing, China in January, 2019. During the real data experiments, RealTime Kinematic (RTK) technology was applied to provide positioning results up to centimeter-level accuracy, which can be regarded as the true position of the running car. The true path of the running car (in red color) in our experiments is shown in Fig.2 
2) SIMULATED DATA
To illustrate the property of the adversarial attacks on different GNSS geometric distribution, simulated dada with different geometric distributions are designed. The simulated receiver position is set based on the real data. The GNSS data is simulated by manually selecting particular party of the observations to obtain different geometric distributions. In this paper, the western observations of the receiver are all blocked.
B. SIMULATED DATA RESULTS
In this section, we mainly use simulated data to analyze the characteristics of adversarial attacks for different geometric distributions. In order to highlight this characteristic, we first select two special cases of geometric distribution with seven observational satellites from the real data of the GNSS receiver to show the performance of our proposed adversarial attacks. Then, we also give an average result to illustrate the effects of adversarial attacks. The sky maps of these two special geometric distributions are shown in Fig. 3 . Fig. 3(a) shows a relatively uniform distribution of the observations. Each satellite of the observations plays a close role in the distribution, and the Geometric Dilution Precision (GDOP) value is 2.53. Fig. 3(b) shows a more extreme distribution. The satellites in the west of the receiver are all blocked, and the GDOP value under this distribution is 3.70.
In the simulation experiments, the two special scenarios with different geometrical distributions of the satellite observations are utilized as examples to illustrate the performance of the proposed adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning. Although the existing RAIM method is always regarded as the last defense of the security system, we proposed a very interesting adversarial attack on GNSS positioning which could work without any RAIM warning. Since the new threat is specifically designed for the RAIM method, the correctly detection percentage of the RAIM method is zero and may be unsuitable for evaluation. Thus, in this paper, we use the area of the spoofing region instead of detection percentage to test the performance of our proposed method. In this paper, the spoofing region is defined as all of the possible positions that the adversarial attacks can mislead the receiver positioning to without triggering the RAIM alarm.
Consider that if all the observations are spoofed, the misleading result can be arbitrary and the test statistic is below the threshold. In the implementation our method, the added spoofing faults on pseudorange is clipped to [−100m, 100m] , where the upper and lower bounds are more than ten times of the standard deviation of the pseudorange errors. The aim of our paper is to propose a new threat for GNSS positioning with adversarial attacks, even though the strength of the spoofing and number of spoofed satellites are limited by using clipped value and mask vector, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4 , the red regions show the spoofing region that cannot trigger the RAIM alarm. It can be seen that the each spoofing region forms a continuous space, and the outer envelope is related to the geometric distribution of the satellite observations. Since adversarial attacks can spoof the observations of the line-of-sights that from the receiver to the satellites to mislead the positioning results, the spoofing region and the geometric distribution of the observations exhibit a consistent shape characteristic. The area of the spoofing region of the two scenarios is 1.3E5 m 2 and 1.8E5 m 2 , respectively, which shows that the worse the geometric distribution of the observations is, the easier the receiver is to be spoofed. A more convincing statistics result is shown as follows.
The above simulation experiments show the results of using adversarial attacks on all satellite observations without using of the mask mechanism. In this experiment, we investigate the performance of the mask mechanism by reducing the number of the spoofed satellites and the results is shown in Fig. 5 .
As shown in Fig. 5 , the horizontal coordinate and vertical coordinate of the figure are the number of the spoofed observations and the average area of the spoofing region, respectively. Different spoofed observations corresponding to the mask mechanism. The experimental results show that the average area of the spoofing region is positively correlated with the number of the spoofed observations, and with the increase of the number of the spoofed observations, the correlation coefficient is gradually reduced. Hence, the proposed method does not need to attack all of the observational satellites at the same time for spoofing. Different with the scenario 1 with all of the GNSS observations, the geometric distribution in scenario 2 is worse as the western observations are blocked. As shown in Fig. 5 , the observations in scenario 2 are easier to be spoofed when compared with the observations in scenario 1. Since the RAIM method uses consistency check for spoofing detection, the more the number of observational satellites, the better the geometric distribution and the smaller the GDOP. With better geometric distribution, the consistency of the observed signals is stronger, which makes the counterfeit signals easier to be detected.
C. REAL DATA RESULTS
In this section, real data obtained by a GNSS receiver on a running car is used to test the practical performance of the proposed method. First, the computing cost of the adversarial attacks is estimated. Then, the spoofed path and the worst case envelopes are calculated to test the performance of the approach. Fig. 6 shows the average computing time of the adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning. The horizontal coordinate is consisted of 1000 samples, which is 5Hz multiplied with 200 seconds for each sortie. The vertical coordinate of the figure is the average computing time for 10 sorties. As shown in Fig. 6 , the computing time is unrelated with the geometric distribution and the mask mechanism. In this paper, the average computing time is 0.63s in our platform.
To evaluate the threat range of the adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning, the cross error in worst cast is analyzed as follows. During the experiments, the cross error is estimated in the lateral direction of the running car, using the difference between the RTK results and the spoofed positioning in the worst case. The mean and standard variance of the cross error in the worst case with different mask mechanism are calculated, and the results of 60 seconds in a sortie are shown in Fig. 7 for an illustration. The blue line (upper line) and the yellow line (low line) are the left envelope and the right envelope of the mean of the cross error in the worst case, respectively. The pink lines of each sample are the corresponding standard variance. Experimental results show that the adversarial attack method can mislead the receiver positioning to any targeted position with a cross error from 20m to 50m. Also, if the number of the spoofed observational satellites is larger, the receiver is more easily misled.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new threat for pseudorange-based RAIM, named adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning, is proposed. Inspired by the adversarial attack method in deep learning model, this paper mainly researches on adversarial attacks on GNSS positioning to obtain the characteristics and shortages of the widely used RAIM methods of the GNSS receiver. Simulated and real experiments results show that the proposed method can mislead the victim receiver deducing any targeted position within a certain range without triggering the RAIM alarm. To have a more safety positioning, the corresponding defense methods will be studied in our future work.
